• In the June 1967 War, “ ...
General Yashayahu Gavish spent most of his time either ‘accompanying’ units down to brigade level—by
which, according to his own definition, he meant staying at that unit’s command post and observing
developments at first hand—or else helicoptering from one unit to another; again, in
his own words, ‘there is no alternative
to looking into a subordinate’s eyes, listening to his tone of voice’. Other sources of information at his disposal included the
usual reporting system; a radio network
linking him with three divisional commanders, which also served to link those commanders with each other; a signals staff whose task
it was to listen in to the divisional communications networks, working around the clock and
reporting to Gavish in writing; messages
passed from the rear, i.e., from General Headquarters in Tel Aviv, linked to Gavish by ‘private’ radiotelephone circuit; and the
results of air reconnaissance forwarded by the Air Force and processed by Rear Headquarters.
Gavish did not depend on these sources
exclusively, however; not only did he spend some time personally listening in
to the radio networks of
subordinate units (on one occasion, Gavish says, he was thereby able to correct an ‘entirely false’ impression of the
battle being formed at Brigadier Gonen’s
headquarters) but he also had a ‘directed telescope’ in the form of elements
of his staff, mounted on
half tracks, following in the wake of the two northernmost divisions and constantly reporting on developments.”
•Martin van Creveld, Command in War,
1982, pp. 199-200.