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- Point of departure
- Historical snapshots
- Categories of conflict
- Synthesis
- Application
- Wrap-up
- Epilogue
- Sources
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- Mission
- To make manifest the nature of moral-mental-physical conflict
- To discern a pattern for successful operations
- To help generalize tactics and strategy
- To find a basis for grand strategy
- Intent
- To unveil the character of conflict, survival, and conquest
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- Need fighter that can both lose energy and gain energy more quickly
while outturning an adversary.
- In other words, suggests a fighter that can pick and choose engagement
opportunities—yet has fast transient (“buttonhook”) characteristics that
can be used to either force an overshoot by an attacker or stay inside a
hard turning defender.
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- Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we should
operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries—or, better yet,
get inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action time
cycle or loop.
- Why? Such activity will make us
appear ambiguous (unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and disorder
among our adversaries—since our adversaries will be unable to generate
mental images or pictures that agree with the menacing as well as faster
transient rhythm or patterns they are competing against.
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- Blitzkrieg vs. Maginot Line mentality (1940)
- F-86 vs. MiG-15 (1951-53)
- Israeli raid (1976)
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- Action
- Exploit operations and weapons that:
- Generate a rapidly changing environment (quick/clear observations,
orientation and decisions, fast-tempo, fast transient maneuvers, quick
kill)
- Inhibit an adversary’s capacity to adapt to such an environment (cloud
or distort his observations, orientation, and decisions and impede his
actions)
- Idea
- Simultaneously compress own time and stretch-out adversary time to
generate a favorable mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to
change
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- Observations
- Quick/clear scanning sensors
- Suppressed/distorted signatures
- Activity
- Fire
- Quick shoot fire control systems and high speed weapons
- Movement
- High speed (supercruise)
- Rapid energy gain and rapid energy loss coupled with high turn rates
and low turn radii
- High pitch rates/high roll rates/high yaw rates coupled with ease of
control
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- Goal
- Survive, survive on own terms, or improve our capacity for independent
action.
- The competition for limited resources to satisfy
these desires may force one to:
- Diminish adversary’s capacity for independent action, or deny him the
opportunity to survive on his own terms, or make it impossible for him
to survive at all.
- Implication
- Life is conflict, survival, and conquest.
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- In addressing any questions about conflict, survival, and conquest one
is naturally led to the
since both treat conflict, survival, and conquest in a very
fundamental way. In this regard, many sources (a few on natural
selection and many on war) are reviewed; many points of view are
exposed.
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- In examining these many points of view one is bombarded with the notion
that:
- It is advantageous to possess a variety of responses that can be
applied rapidly to gain sustenance, avoid danger, and diminish
adversary’s capacity for independent action.
- The simpler organisms—those that make-up man as well as man working
with other men in a higher level context—must cooperate or, better yet,
harmonize their activities in their endeavors to survive as an organic
synthesis.
- To shape and adapt to change one cannot be passive; instead one must
take the initiative.
- Put more simply and directly: the above comments leave one with the
impression that variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative (and their
interaction) seem to be key qualities that permit one to shape and adapt
to an ever-changing environment.
- With this impression in mind together with our notion of getting inside
an adversary’s O-O-D-A loop we will proceed in our historical
investigation.
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- Theme
- Harmony and trust
- Justice and well being
- Inscrutability and enigma
- Deception and subversion
- Rapidity and fluidity
- Dispersion and concentration
- Surprise and shock
- Strategy
- Probe enemy’s organization and dispositions to unmask his strengths,
weaknesses, patterns of movement and intentions.
- “Shape” enemy’s perception of world to manipulate his plans and actions.
- Attack enemy’s plans as best policy. Next best disrupt his alliances.
Next best attack his army. Attack cities only when there is no
alternative.
- Employ cheng and ch'i maneuvers to quickly and unexpectedly hurl
strength against weaknesses.
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- Early commanders
- Alexander
- Hannibal
- Belisarius
- Jenghis Khan
- Tamerlane
- Impression
- Early commanders seem consistent with ideas of Sun Tzu
- Western commanders more directly concerned with winning the battle
- Eastern commanders closer to Sun Tzu in attempting to shatter adversary
prior to battle
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- Keeping in mind the ideas of Sun Tzu and our comments about early
commanders, let’s take a look at an early tactical theme and some battle
(grand tactical) situations to gain a feel for the different ways that
the cheng/ch'i game has been (and can be) played.
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- Tactical theme (from about 300 B.C. to 1400 A.D.)
- Light troops (equipped with bows, javelins, light swords, etc.) perform
reconnaissance, screening, and swirling hit-and-run actions to:
- Unmask enemy dispositions and activities.
- Cloud/distort own dispositions and activities.
- Confuse, disorder enemy operations.
- Heavy troops (equipped with lances, bows, swords, etc.) protected by
armor and shields:
- Charge and smash thinned-out/scattered or disordered/bunched-up enemy
formations generated by interaction with light troops; or
- Menace enemy formations to hold them in tight, or rigid, arrays thereby
make them vulnerable to missiles of swirling light troops.
- Light and heavy troops in appropriate combination pursue, envelop, and
mop-up isolated remnants of enemy host.
- Idea
- Employ maneuver action by light troops with thrust action of heavy
troops to confuse, break-up, and smash enemy formations.
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- Battle of Leuctra (371 B.C.)
- At this battle Frederick Engels (according to Savkin) credited
Epaminondas for having first discovered and employed an unequal or
uneven distribution of forces across a front as basis to concentrate
forces for the main attack at the decisive point.
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- Battles of Marathon, Leuctra, Arbela, and Cannae emphasize an unequal
distribution as basis for local superiority and decisive leverage to
collapse adversary resistance.
- on the other hand
- The discussion (so far) provides little insight on how these battle
arrangements and follow-on maneuvers play upon moral factors such as
doubt, fear, anxiety, etc.
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- Key asymmetries
- Superior mobility
- Superior communications
- Superior intelligence
- Superior leadership
- Theme
- Widely separated strategic maneuvers, with appropriate stratagems,
baited retreats, hard-hitting tactical thrusts, and swirling
envelopments to uncover and exploit adversary vulnerabilities and
weaknesses.
- in conjunction with
- Clever and calculated use of propaganda and terror to play upon
adversary’s doubts, fears, and superstitions in order to undermine his
resolve and destroy his will to resist.
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- Even though outnumbered, why were Mongols able to maneuver in widely
scattered arrays without being defeated separately or in detail?
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- Message
- By exploiting superior leadership, intelligence, communications, and
mobility as well as by playing upon adversary’s fears and doubts via
propaganda and terror, Mongols operated inside adversary
observation-orientation-decision-action loops.
- Result
- Outnumbered Mongols created impressions of terrifying strength—by
seeming to come out of nowhere yet be everywhere.
- hence,
- Subversive propaganda, clever stratagems, fast breaking maneuvers, and
calculated terror not only created vulnerabilities and weaknesses but
also played upon moral factors that drain-away resolve, produce panic,
and bring about collapse.
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- 18th century theoreticians
- Saxe
- Bourcet
- Guibert
- Du Teil
- Theme
- Plan with several branches
- Mobility/fluidity of force
- Cohesion
- Dispersion and concentration
- Operate on a line to threaten alternative objectives
- Concentrate direct artillery fire on key points to be forced
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- 18th century theoreticians
- Saxe
- Bourcet
- Guibert
- Du Teil
- Theme
- Plan with several branches
- Mobility/fluidity of force
- Cohesion
- Dispersion and concentration
- Operate on a line to threaten alternative objectives
- Concentrate direct artillery fire on key points to be forced
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- The ideas of Sun Tzu, Saxe, Bourcet, and Guibert seem to be at home with
either
- regular or guerrilla warfare.
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- Revolutionary army gifts to Napoleon
- Moral and physical energy of citizen-soldiers and new leaders generated
by the revolution and magnified by successes against invading allied
armies
- Subdivision of army into smaller self-contained but mutually supporting
units (divisions)
- Ability to travel light and live-off countryside without extensive
baggage, many supply wagons, and slow-moving resupply efforts
- Rapid march associated with “120” instead of the standard “70” steps per
minute
- Discontinued adherence to 1791 Drill Regulations pertaining to the well
regulated and stereotype use of column and line formations for movement
and fighting
- Beneficial asymmetry
- Mobility/fluidity of force dramatically better than that possessed by
potential adversaries.
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- General features
- Plan and resolution:
- Evolve plan with appropriate variations each of which correspond to
probable or possible actions. Employ Intelligence/recce units (spies,
agents, cavalry, etc.) in predetermined directions to eliminate or
confirm hypotheses concerning enemy actions thereby reduce uncertainty
and simplify own plans as well as uncover adversary plans and
intentions.
- Security:
- Generate misinformation, devise stratagems, and alter composition of
major formations to confuse and baffle enemy agents, spies, etc. Employ
screens of cavalry, infantry, or both and make rise of natural features
such as terrain, weather, and darkness to mask dispositions and cloak
movements against enemy observation.
- Strategic dispersion and tactical concentration:
- Expand then contract intervals between force components in an irregular
and rapid fashion to cloud/distort strategic penetration maneuvers yet quickly
focus tactical effort for a convergent blow at the decisive point.
- Vigorous offensive action:
- Seize initiative at the outset by attacking enemy with an ever-shifting
kaleidoscope of (strategic) moves and diversions in order to upset his
actions and unsettle his plans thereby psychologically unbalance him
and keep initiative throughout.
- Strategic theme
- Use unified (or single) line of operations as basis for mutual support
between separated adjacent and follow-on units.
- Menace (and try to seize) adversary communications to isolate his forces
from outside support or reinforcement and force him to fight under
unfavorable circumstances by the following actions:
- Employ fraction of force to hold or divert adversary attention—by
feints, demonstrations, pinning maneuvers, etc.
- Exploit “exterior maneuvers” against exposed flanks or “interior
maneuvers” thru a weak front to place (bulk of) forces in adversary’s
flank and rear.
- Set-up supporting “centers (bases) of operation” and alternative lines
of communication and keep (at least some) safe and open as basis to
maintain freedom of maneuver.
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- Early tactic
- “The action was opened by a cloud of sharpshooters, some mounted, some
on foot, who were sent forward to carry out a general rather than a
minutely-regulated mission; they proceeded to harass the enemy, escaping
from his superior numbers by their mobility, from the effect of his
cannon by their dispersal. They were constantly relieved to ensure that
the fire did not slacken, and they also received considerable reinforcement
to increase their over-all effect … Once the chink in foe’s armour had
been revealed … the horse artillery would gallop up and open fire with
canister at close range. The attacking force would meantime be moving up
in the indicated direction, the infantry advancing in column, the
cavalry in regiments or squadrons, ready to make its presence felt
anywhere or everywhere as required. Then, when the hail of enemy bullets
or cannon balls began to slacken … The soldiers would begin to run
forward, those in the front ranks crossing their bayonets, as the drums
beat the charge; the sky would ring a thousand battle-cries constantly
repeated: “En avant. En avant. Vive la Republique.”
- Later tactics
- “At the outset, a heavy bombardment would be loosed against the enemy
formations, causing fearful losses if they failed to seek shelter, and
generally lowering their power of resistance. Under cover of this fire,
swarms of voltigeurs would advance to within musketry range and add a
disconcerting ‘nuisance’ element by sniping at officers and the like.
This preliminary phase would be followed by a series of heavy cavalry
and infantry attacks. The secret of these was careful timing and
coordination. The first cavalry charges were designed to defeat the
hostile cavalry and compel the enemy infantry to form squares”, thereby
reduce fire in any one direction and enable the columns to get to close
grips before the enemy could resume his linear formation. The infantry
(deployed or not) and accompanying horse artillery would then blaze a
gap in the enemy formation and finally the cavalry would sweep forward,
again, to exploit the breakthrough.
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- Critique
- Napoleon exploited ambiguity, deception, and mobility at the strategic
level,
- whereas,
- He increasingly emphasized formal battering ram methods and
de-emphasized loose, irregular methods (e.g. skirmishers) at the tactics
level—via a return to, and increasingly heavy-handed application of, the
1791 Drill Regulations.
- Why?
- Napoleon emphasized the conduct of war from the top down. He created and exploited strategic
success to procure grand tactical and tactical success.
- To support his concept, he set up a highly centralized command and
control system which, when coupled with essentially unvarying tactical
recipes, resulted in strength smashing into strength by increasingly
unimaginative, formalized, and predictable actions at lower and lower
levels.
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- The Napoleonic spirit
- Strategic “fog” followed by stereotyped and ruinous tactical assaults.
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- Character/nature of war
- An act of policy to use violence to impose one’s will upon another
- Duel or act of human interaction directed against an animate object that
reacts
- Uncertainty of information acts as an impediment to vigorous activity.
- Psychological/moral forces and effects (danger, intelligence, emotional
factors …) either impede or stimulate activity.
- Friction (interaction of many factors, including those above) impedes
activity.
- Genius (harmonious balance of mind/temperament that permit one to
overcome friction and excel at the complex activity of war) changes the
nature and magnifies the scope of operations.
- Strategy
- Exhaust enemy by influencing him to increase his expenditure of effort.
- Seek out those centers of gravity upon which all power/movement depend
and, if possible, trace them back to a single one.
- Compress all effort, against those centers, into the fewest possible
actions
- Subordinate all minor, or secondary, actions as much as possible.
- Move with the utmost speed.
- Seek the major battle (with superiority of number and conditions that
will promise a decisive victory.
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- Critique
- Clausewitz overemphasized decisive battle and underemphasized strategic
maneuver.
- Clausewitz emphasized method and routine at the tactical level.
- Why?
- Clausewitz was concerned with trying to overcome, or reduce,
friction/uncertainty. He failed to address the idea of magnifying
adversary’s friction/uncertainty.
- Clausewitz was concerned with trying to exhaust adversary by influencing
him to increase his expenditure of effort. He failed to address, or
develop, the idea of trying to paralyze adversary by denying him the
opportunity of expend effort.
- Clausewitz incorrectly stated: “A center of gravity is always found
where the mass is concentrated most densely”—then argued that this is
the place where the blows must be aimed and where the decision should be
reached. He failed to develop idea of generating many non-cooperative
centers of gravity by striking at those vulnerable, yet critical,
tendons, connections, and activities that permit a larger system to
exist.
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- Message
- Clausewitz did not see that many non-cooperative, or conflicting,
centers of gravity paralyze adversary by denying him the opportunity to
operate in a directed fashion, hence they impede vigorous activity and
magnify friction.
- Likely result
- Operations end in a “bloodbath”—via the well regulated stereotyped
tactics and unimaginative battles of attrition suggested by Clausewitz.
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- Secret of success
- “… the narratives of Frederick the Great: commenced to initiate me in
the secret which had caused him to gain the miraculous victory of
Leuthen. I perceived that this secret consisted in the very simple
maneuver of carrying the bulk of his forces upon a single wing of the
hostile army … I found again, afterwards, the same cause in the first
successes of Napoleon in Italy, which gave me the idea that by
applying, through strategy, to the whole chess-table of a war this same
principle which Frederick had applied to battles, we should have the
key to all the science of war.”
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- Key idea and supporting mechanism
- Generalize oblique order associated with Battles at Leuctra and Leuthen
- Divide theater and its subordinate components (zones, fronts, positions,
etc.) into three-subdivisions—a center and two wings—as basis to apply
the Leuctra/Leuthen concept in strategic and grand tactical maneuvers.
- Set-up base(s) of operations and (alternative) lines of communication
for freedom to shape and shift flow/direction of operations as basis to
apply Leuctra/Leuthen strategic and grand tactical maneuvers.
- Strategy/grand tactics
- By free and rapid movements carry bulk of the forces (successively)
against fractions of the enemy.
- Strike in the most decisive direction—that is to say against the center
or one wing or the center and one wing simultaneously.
- If possible, seize adversary’s communications (without losing one’s own)
and force him to fight on a reverse front, by using bulk of forces to
hit his flank and take him in the rear—while using detachments, as
needed, to block the arrival of reinforcements as well as draw his
attention elsewhere.
- If the enemy’s forces are too much extended, pierce his center to divide
and crush his fractions separately.
- To outflank and turn (envelop) a wing, hit enemy in the flank and also
contain him at the front.
- An attack may be made simultaneously upon both extremities but not when
the attacking force is equal or inferior (numerically) to the enemy.
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- Critique
- Preoccupation with form of operations, spatial arrangement of bases,
formal orders of battle, and tactical formations.
- Lack of appreciation for the use of loose, irregular swarms of
guerrillas and skirmishers to mask own dispositions, activities, and
intentions as well as confuse and disorder enemy operations.
- Likely result
- Operations become stereotyped—unless one can appreciate Jomini’s ideas
outside their formal underpinnings.
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- Key point
- Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini did not appreciate importance of
loose, irregular tactical arrangements and activities to mask or
distort own presence and intentions as well as confuse and disorder
adversary operations.
- ? Why ?
- Major flaw
- Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini viewed the conduct of war and related
operations in essentially one direction—from the top down—emphasizing
adaptability at the top and regularity at the bottom.
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- “There are three great maxims common to the whole science of war; they
are:
- 1st—Concentrate your force, and act with the whole of it on one part
only of the enemy’s force.
- 2nd—Act against the weakest part of your enemy—his center, if he is
dispersed; his flank or rear, if concentrated. Act against his
communications without endangering your own.
- 3rd—Whatever you do, as soon as you have made your plan, and taken the
decision to act upon it, act with the utmost speed, so that you may
obtain your object before the enemy suspects what you are about.”
- Caution
- While these maxims by Schalk portray, in a general way, physical maneuvers
that can be used to realize one’s purpose in war at the strategic level,
they do not address the non-adaptability and predictability (via the
drill regulation mind-set) that permeated 19th century “maneuvers” at
the tactical level.
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- Key ingredients
- Railroad/telegraph
- Quick fire artillery
- Machine gun
- Repeating rifle
- Barbed wire
- Trenches
- Early trends
- Emphasis toward massed firepower and large armies supported by rail
logistics
- Increased emphasis on a holding defense and flanking or wide turning
maneuvers into adversary rear to gain a decision
- Continued use of frontal assaults by large stereotyped infantry
formations (e.g. regiments, battalions), supported by artillery
barrages, against regions of strong resistance
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- The legacy of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini’s tactical regularity and
the continued use of large stereotyped formations for tactical assault,
together with the mobilization of large armies and massing of enormous
supplies through a narrow logistics network, “telegraphed” any punch
hence minimized the possibility of exploiting ambiguity, deception, and mobility
to generate surprise for a decisive edge.
- In this sense, technology was being used as a crude club that generated
frightful and debilitating casualties on all sides during the:
- American Civil War (1861-65)
- Austro-Prussian War (1866)
- Franco-Prussian War (1870)
- Boer War (1899-1902)
- Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)
- World War I (1914-18)
- Point
- Evolution of tactics did not keep pace with increased weapons lethality
developed and produced by 19th century technology.
- ? Raises question ?
- Why were the 19th century and early 20th century commanders unable to
evolve better tactics to avoid over a half century of debilitating
casualties?
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- Comment
- A look back reveals that we have been speaking of conflict between
social systems, rather than within social systems. With the explosive
expansion of capitalism in the 19th century we begin to see the rise of
much turmoil and attendant conflict due to opposing tendencies contained
within capitalism itself.
- Trend
- Without going into explicit detail we find (according to many
investigators, including Karl Marx): that the interaction of
competition, technology, specialization (division of labor),
concentration of production in large scale enterprises, and the taking
and plowing back of profits into this interaction produce opposing
tendencies and periodic crises that leave in their wake more and more
workers competing for jobs in fewer and fewer, but larger, firms that
increasingly emphasize (percentage-wise) the use of more machines and
less labor.
- Result
- Low paid wage earners exhibit discontent and hatred for a system that
permits others to live in comfort or luxury while they must live a life
of toil, subject to strict and frequently harsh factory discipline.
- Witnessing these unfolding circumstances disillusioned intellectuals,
bankrupt owners, and others take the side of the workers, as an enlightened
vanguard, to mold them into a powerful opposition.
- Raises question
- How should such an unpleasant situation be corrected?
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- Message
- According to Marx/Engels and their followers, the only way out is via
revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat (workers) to smash the
capitalistic system and replace it with one that does not exploit and
oppress masses for the benefit of a ruling elite or class.
- Necessary conditions for success
- Crisis generated by discontent/misery of masses and vacillation by
authorities who indicate unwillingness or inability to come to grips
with existing instability.
- Vanguard, or disciplined hard core, that offers leadership, provides a
way out, and has support of masses.
- Why
- Crises represent height of confusion/disorder due to many opposing
tendencies (centers of gravity) that magnify friction, hence paralyze
efforts by authorities to dominate such surges of turmoil. In this
sense, crises are periods of vulnerability/weakness that beg to be
exploited.
- Vanguards represent disciplined moral/mental/physical bodies focused to
shape and guide masses as well as participate in action to exploit and
expand confusion/disorder of crises that shake adversary’s will to
respond in a directed way.
- Key insight
- Crises and Vanguards are the golden keys that permit us to penetrate to
the core of insurrection/revolution and, as we shall see later, modern
guerrilla warfare.
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- The creation of crises and vanguards, via 19th century capitalism, make
evident the foundations upon which to conduct insurrection/revolution in
order to destroy a society from within.
- On the other hand
- It is not yet clear how these notions change or fit into the way we
exploit technology and conduct war against societies from within as well
as from without. To gain such an appreciation we must look at the period
containing World War I, World War II, and their aftermath.
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- Plans and execution
- Stagnation
- Finale
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- Action
- Offensives conducted on wide frontages—emphasizing few, rather than
many, harmonious yet independent thrusts.
- Evenness of advance maintained to protect flanks and provide artillery
support as advance makes headway.
- Reserves thrown in whenever attack held-up—against regions or points of
strong resistance.
- Reaction
- Defense organized into depth of successive belts of fortified terrain.
- Massed artillery and machine-gun fire designed to arrest and pin down
attacker.
- Counter-attack to win back lost ground.
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- Infiltration tactics
- Guerrilla tactics
- Capt. Andre Laffargue
- Gen. von Hutier?
- Gen. Ludendorff
- T.E. Lawrence
- Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck
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- Action
- Brief but intense artillery bombardment, that includes gas and smoke
shell, to disrupt/suppress defenses and obscure the assault.
- Stosstruppen (small teams or squads of thrust troops equipped with light
machine-guns, flame-throwers, etc.) thrust forward close behind rolling
artillery barrage, without any “effort to maintain a uniform rate of
advance or align formations”. Instead, as many tiny, irregular swarms
spaced in breadth and echeloned in depth, they seep or flow into any
gaps or weaknesses they can find in order to drive deep into adversary
rear.
- Kampfgruppen (small battle groups consisting of infantry,
machine-gunners, mortar teams, artillery observers and field engineers)
follow-up to cave-in exposed flanks and mop-up isolated centers of
resistance from flank and rear.
- Reserves and stronger follow-on echelons move through newly created
breaches to maintain momentum and exploit success, as well as attack
flanks and rear to widen penetration and consolidate gains against
counter attack.
- Idea
- Hurl strength (echeloned in great depth), via an irruption of many
thrusts, thru weaknesses along (many) paths of least resistance to gain
the opportunity for breakthrough and envelopment.
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- Note
- Such classic descriptions, often repeated, create in listeners or
readers minds vivid images of the infiltration technique.
- Critique
- Unfortunately this depiction does not address how and why infiltration
fire and movement schemes work.
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- Key points
- Fire at all levels by artillery, mortars, and machine-guns is exploited
to hold adversary attention and pin him down hence—
- Fire together with gas and smoke (as well as fog and mist) represent an
immediate and ominous threat to capture adversary attention, force heads
down and dramatically obscure view, thereby cloak infiltrators
movements.
- Dispersed and irregular character of moving swarms (as opposed to well
defined line abreast formations) permit infiltrators to blend against
irregular and changing terrain features as they push forward.
- Taken together, the captured attention, the obscured view, and the
indistinct character of moving dispersed/irregular swarms deny adversary
the opportunity to picture what is taking place.
- Result
- Infiltration teams appear to suddenly loom-up out of nowhere to blow
thru, around, and behind disoriented defenders.
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- Essence
- Cloud/distort signature and improve mobility to avoid fire yet focus
effort to penetrate, shatter, envelop, and mop-up disconnected or
isolated debris of adversary system.
- Intent
- Exploit tactical dispersion in a focused way to gain tactical success
and expand it into a grand tactical success.
- Implication
- Small units exploiting tactical dispersion in a focused way—rather than
large formations abiding by the “Principle of Concentration”—penetrate
adversary to generate many non-cooperative (or isolated) centers of
gravity as basis to magnify friction, paralyze effort, and bring about
adversary collapse.
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- Are infiltration tactics a rejection of the Napoleonic methods—or are
they application of these methods under a different guise?
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- Response
- Infiltration fire and movement schemes can be viewed as Napoleon’s
multi-thrust strategic penetration maneuvers being transformed into
multi-thrust tactical penetration maneuvers down to the lowest
operational/organizational level—the squad.
- Point
- Until the rise of the infiltration tactics (and the use of tanks by the
allies) in the latter part of WWI, neither the 19th century nor the 20th
century commanders were able to evolve effective tactical penetration
maneuvers that could offset the massive increase in weapons lethality
developed during this same period.
- Why
- The aristocratic tradition, the top-down command and control system, the
slavish addiction to the “Principle of Concentration”, and the drill
regulation mind-set, all taken together, reveal an “obsession for
control” by high-level superiors over low-level subordinates that
restrict any imagination, initiative, and adaptability needed by a
system to evolve the indistinct-irregular-mobile tactics that could
counter the increase in weapons lethality.
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- Result
- Immediate success at platoon/company/battalion level coupled with
ultimate failure at corps/army level.
- Why
- Ludendorff violated his own concept by his tendency to use strategic
reserves to reinforce against hardened resistance—hence, at the
strategic level, he seduced himself into supporting failure not success.
- Exhaustion of combat teams leading the assault.
- Logistics too inflexible to support rapid/fluid penetration and deeper
exploitation of breakthrough.
- Communications too immobile to allow command to quickly identify and
reinforce successful advances.
- Elastic zone defense, when used, (as developed by the Germans and
practiced by Pétain) that emphasizes artillery and flank attacks against
penetrations when they stretch beyond their own artillery support.
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- Action
- Gain support of population. Must “arrange the minds” of friend, foe and
neutral alike. Must “get inside their minds”.
- Must “be an idea or thing invulnerable, without front or back, drifting
about like a gas” (inconspicuousness and fluidity-of action). Must be an
“attack-in-depth”.
- Tactics “should be tip-and-run, not pushes but strokes” with “use of the
smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place”.
- Should be a war of detachment (avoiding contact and presenting a threat
everywhere) using mobility/fluidity-of-action and environmental
background (vast unknown desert) as basis for “never affording a target”
and “never on the defensive except by accident and in error”.
- Idea
- Disintegrate existing regime’s ability to govern.
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- Infiltration tactics a la Ludendorff seem to be similar in nature to
irregular or guerrilla tactics a la Lawrence.
- Why? Both stress clouded/distorted signatures, mobility and cohesion of
small units as basis to insert an amorphous yet focused effort into or
thru adversary weaknesses.
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- Soviet revolutionary strategy
- Lenin, and after him Stalin, exploited the idea of crises and vanguards—that
arise out of Marxian contradictions within capitalism—to lay-out Soviet
revolutionary strategy.
- Result:
- A scheme that emphasizes moral/psychological factors as basis to
destroy a regime from within.
- Lightning war (Blitzkrieg)
- Infiltration tactics of 1918 were mated with:
- Tank
- Motorized Artillery
- Tactical Aircraft
- Motor Transport
- Better Communications
- Result:
- Blitzkrieg to generate a breakthrough by piercing a region with
multiple narrow thrusts using armor, motorized infantry, and follow-up
infantry divisions supported by tactical aircraft.
- Guerrilla war
- Mao Tse-Tung synthesized Sun Tzu’s ideas, classic guerrilla strategy and
tactics, and Napoleonic style mobile operations under an umbrella of
Soviet revolutionary ideas to create a powerful way for waging modern
(guerrilla) war.
- Result:
- Modern guerrilla warfare has become an overall political, economic,
social and military framework for “total war”.
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- Tasks
- Employ agitation and propaganda in order to exploit opposing tendencies,
internal tensions, etc. Object is to bring about a crises, to make
revolution ripe as well as convince masses that there is a way-out. This
is accomplished when the vanguard is able to:
- Fan discontent/misery of working class and masses and focus it as
hatred toward existing system.
- Cause vacillation/indecision among authorities so that they cannot come
to grips with existing instability.
- “Confuse other elements in society so that they don’t know exactly what
is happening or where the movement is going.”
- Convince “proletariat class they have a function—the function of
promoting revolution in order to secure the promised ideal society.”
- Concentrate “the main forces of the revolution at the enemy’s most
vulnerable spot at the decisive moment, when the revolution has already
become ripe, when the offensive is going full steam ahead, when
insurrection is knocking at the door, and when bringing the reserves up
to the vanguard is the decisive condition of success.” To quote Lenin on
paraphrasing Marx and Engels:
- “Never play with insurrection, but, when beginning it, firmly realize
that you must go to the end.”
- “Concentrate a great superiority of forces at the decisive point, at
the decisive moment, otherwise the enemy, who has the advantage of
better preparation and organization, will destroy the insurgents.”
- “Once the insurrection has begun, you must act with the greatest
determination, and by all means, without fail, take the offensive. The
defensive is the death of an armed rising.’“
- “You must try to take the enemy by surprise and seize the moment when
his forces are scattered.”
- “You must strive for daily successes, even if small (one might say
hourly, if it is the case of one town), and at all costs retain the
‘moral ascendancy.”
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- Tasks
- Select “the moment for the decisive blow, the moment for starting the
insurrection, so timed as to coincide with the moment when the crisis
has reached its climax, when the vanguard is prepared to fight to the
end, the reserves are prepared to support the vanguard, and maximum
consternation reigns in the ranks of the enemy.” According to Lenin the
decisive moment has arrived when:
- “All the class forces hostile to us have become sufficiently entangled,
are sufficiently at loggerheads, have sufficiently weakened themselves
in a struggle which is beyond their strength;”
- “All the vacillating, wavering, unstable, intermediate elements—the
petty bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeois democrats as distinct from the
bourgeoisie—have sufficiently exposed themselves in the eyes of the
people, have sufficiently disgraced themselves through their practical
bankruptcy;”
- “Among the proletariat a mass sentiment in favor of supporting the most
determined, supremely bold, revolutionary action against the
bourgeoisie has arisen and has. begun to grow vigorously. Then
revolution is indeed ripe. Then, indeed, if we have correctly gauged
all the conditions indicated above … and if we have chosen the moment
rightly, our victory is assured.”
- Pursue “the course adopted, no matter what difficulties and
complications are encountered on the road towards the goal. This is
necessary in order that the vanguard not lose sight of the main goal of
the struggle and the masses not stray from the road while marching
towards that goal and striving to rally around the vanguard.”
- Maneuver “the reserves with a view to effecting a proper retreat when
the enemy is strong … when, with the given relation of forces, retreat
becomes the only way to escape a blow against the vanguard and retain
the vanguard’s reserves. The object of this strategy is to gain time, to
disrupt the enemy, and to accumulate forces in order later to assume the
offensive.”
- Goal
- Destroy capitalism as well as its offspring imperialism and replace it
with a dictatorship of the proletariat.
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- Infiltration and isolation
- Blitz and guerrillas infiltrate a nation or regime at all levels to
soften and shatter the moral fiber of the political, economic and social
structure. Simultaneously, via diplomatic, psychological, and various
sub-rosa or other activities, they strip-away potential allies thereby
isolate intended victim(s) for forthcoming blows. To carry out this
program, a la Sun Tzu, blitz, and guerrillas:
- Probe and test adversary, and any allies that may rally to his side, in
order to unmask strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions.
- Exploit critical differences of opinion, internal contradictions,
frictions, obsessions, etc., in order to foment mistrust, sow discord
and shape both adversary’s and allies’ perception of the world thereby:
- Create atmosphere of “mental confusion, contradiction of feeling,
indecisiveness, panic” …
- Manipulate or undermine adversary’s plans and actions.
- Make it difficult, if not impossible, for allies to aid adversary
during his time of trial.
- Purpose
- Force capitulation when combined with external political, economic, and
military pressures
- or
- Weaken foe to minimize his resistance against military blows that will
follow.
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- Action
- Intelligence (signal, photo, agent … ), reconnaissance (air and ground),
and patrol actions probe and test adversary before and during combat
operations to uncover as well as shape changing patterns of strengths,
weaknesses, moves, and intentions.
- Adversary patterns, and associated changes, are weighed against friendly
situation to expose attractive, or appropriate, alternatives that
exploit adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence help shape
mission commitment and influence command intent.
- Mission assigned. Schwerpunkt (focus of main effort) established before
and shifted during combat operations to bypass adversary strength and
strike at weakness. Nebenpunkte (other related or supporting efforts)
employed to tie-up, focus, or drain-away adversary attention and
strength (elsewhere).
- Special seizure/disruption teams infiltrate (by air or other means)
enemy rear areas where, with agents already in place, they: seize
bridges and road crossings, sever communications, incapacitate or
blow-up power stations, seize or blow-up fuel dumps, … as well as sow
confusion/disorder via “false messages and fake orders”.
- Indirect and direct air firepower efforts together with (any needed)
sudden/brief preliminary artillery fires are focused in appropriate
areas to impede (or channel) adversary movement, disrupt communications,
suppress forward defensive fires, obscure the advance, and divert
attention.
- Armored reconnaissance or stormtrooper teams, leading armored columns,
advance rapidly from least expected regions and infiltrate adversary
front to find paths of least resistance.
- Armored assault teams of tanks, infantry, anti-tank guns, and combat
engineers as well as other specialists, together with close artillery
and air support, quickly open breaches (via frontal/flank fire and
movement combinations) into adversary rear along paths of least
resistance uncovered by armored reconnaissance or stormtroopers.
- When breakthrough occurs, relatively independent mobile/armored teams
led by armored recce with air support (recce, fire, and airlift when
necessary), blow-through to penetrate at high speed deep into adversary
interior. Object is to cut lines of communication, disrupt movement,
paralyze command and envelop adversary forces and resources.
- Motorized or foot infantry further back supported by artillery and armor
pour-in to collapse isolated pockets of resistance, widen the breaches
and secure the encirclement or captured terrain against possible
counter-attack.
- Idea
- Conquer an entire region in the quickest possible time by gaining initial
surprise and exploiting the fast tempo/fluidity-of-action of armored
teams, with air support, as basis to repeatedly penetrate, splinter,
envelop, and roll-up/wipe-out disconnected remnants of adversary
organism in order to confuse, disorder, and finally shatter his will or
capacity to resist.
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- Impression
- Reflection upon discussion, so far, reveals that Blitzkrieg generates
many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as undermines or seizes
those that adversary depends upon, in order to impede vigorous activity
and magnify friction, thereby paralyze adversary by denying him the
opportunity to operate in a directed way.
- ? Raises nagging question ?
- How do blitzers simultaneously sustain rapid pace and abruptly adapt to
changing circumstances without losing cohesion or coherency of their
overall effort?
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- Key point
- Each level from simple to complex (platoon to theater) has their own
observation-orientation-decision-action time cycle that increases as we
try to control more levels and details of command at the higher levels.
Put simply, as the number of events we must consider increase, the
longer it takes to observe-orient-decide-act.
- Idea
- This brings out the idea that faster tempo, or rhythm, at lower levels
should work within the slower rhythm but larger pattern at higher levels
so that overall system does not lose its cohesion or coherency.
- Raises question
- How do blitzers harmonize these differing tempos/rhythms so that they
can exploit the faster rhythm/smaller pattern (of the lower-level units)
yet maintain the coherency of the rhythm/pattern for the larger effort?
- Response
- Give lower-level commanders wide freedom, within an overall
mind-time-space scheme, to shape/direct their own activities so that
they can exploit faster tempo/rhythm at tactical levels yet be in
harmony with the larger pattern/slower rhythm associated with the more
general aim and larger effort at the strategic level.
- Shaping agents
- Shape overall scheme by using mission concept or sense of mission to fix
responsibility and shape commitment at all levels and through all parts
of the organism. Likewise, use Schwerpunkt concept through all levels to
link differing rhythms/patterns so that each part or level of the
organic whole can operate at its own natural rhythm—without pulling
organism apart—instead of the slower pace associated with a rigid
centralized control.
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- What does an overall mind-time-space scheme imply or presuppose?
- How do mission and Schwerpunkt concepts give shape to this overall
scheme?
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- Message
- According to General Gunther Blumentritt, such a scheme presupposes a
common outlook based upon “a body of professional officers who have
received exactly the same training during the long years of peace and
with the same tactical education, the same way of thinking, identical
speech, hence a body of officers to whom all tactical conceptions were
fully clear.”
- Furthermore, a la General Blumentritt, it presupposes “an officers
training institution which allows the subordinate a very great measure
of freedom of action and freedom in the manner of executing orders and
which primarily calls for independent daring, initiative and sense of
responsibility.”
- Point
- Without a common outlook superiors cannot give subordinates
freedom-of-action and maintain coherency of ongoing action.
- Implication
- A common outlook possessed by “a body of officers” represents a unifying
theme that can be used to simultaneously encourage subordinate
initiative yet realize superior intent.
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- Very nice, but how do the German concepts of mission and Schwerpunkt
give shape to this scheme?
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- Message
- The German concept of mission can be thought of as a contract, hence an
agreement, between superior and subordinate. The subordinate agrees to
make his actions serve his superior’s intent in terms of what is to be
accomplished, while the superior agrees to give his subordinate wide
freedom to exercise his imagination and initiative in terms of how
intent is to be realized.
- As part of this concept, the subordinate is given the right to challenge
or question the feasibility of mission if he feels his superior’s ideas
on what can be achieved are not in accord with the existing situation or
if he feels his superior has not given him adequate resources to carry
it out. Likewise, the superior has every right to expect his subordinate
to carry-out the mission contract when agreement is reached on what can
be achieved consistent with the existing situation and resources
provided.
- Limitation
- While this concept of mission gives form and expression to what is
expected between an individual superior and subordinate, it does not
suggest ways to coordinate or harmonize activities among many superiors
and subordinates as a collective group.
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- With this limitation in mind how does Schwerpunkt play into or add to
this concept?
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- Message
- Schwerpunkt acts as a center or axis or harmonizing agent that is used
to help shape commitment and convey or carry-out intent, at all levels
from theater to platoon, hence an image around which:
- Maneuver of all arms and supporting elements are focused to exploit
opportunities and maintain tempo of operations,
- and
- Initiative of many subordinates is harmonized with superior intent.
- In this sense Schwerpunkt can be thought of as:
- A focusing agent that naturally produces an unequal distribution of
effort as a basis to generate superiority in some sectors by
thinning-out others,
- as well as
- A medium to realize superior intent without impeding initiative of many
subordinates, hence a medium through which subordinate initiative is
implicitly connected to superior intent.
- Implication
- Schwerpunkt represents a unifying concept that provides a way to rapidly
shape focus and direction of effort as well as harmonize support
activities with combat operations, thereby permit a true
decentralization of tactical command within centralized strategic
guidance—without losing cohesion of overall effort.
- or put another way
- Schwerpunkt represents a unifying medium that provides a directed way to
tie initiative of many subordinate actions with superior intent as a
basis to diminish friction and compress time in order to generate a
favorable mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to unfolding
circumstances.
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- Impression
- The German operational philosophy based upon a common outlook and
freedom-of-action, and realized through their concepts of mission and Schwerpunkt,
emphasized implicit over explicit communication.
- which suggests
- The secret of the German command and control system lies in what’s unstated
or not communicated to one another—to exploit lower-level initiative yet
realize higher-level intent, thereby diminish friction and reduce time,
hence gain both quickness and security.
- Result
- The Germans were able to repeatedly operate inside their adversary’s
observation-orientation-decision-action loops.
- or as stated by General Blumentritt,
- “The entire operational and tactical leadership method hinged upon … rapid,
concise assessment of situations … quick decision and quick execution,
on the principle: ‘each minute ahead of the enemy is an advantage.’”
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- Why employ multiple thrusts, bundles of multiple thrusts, or bundles of
thrusts inside bundles of thrusts?
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- Present many (fast breaking) simultaneous and sequential happenings to
generate confusion and disorder—thereby stretch-out time for adversary
to respond in a directed fashion.
- Multiply opportunities, to uncover, create, and penetrate gaps, exposed
flanks, and vulnerable rears.
- Create and multiply opportunities to splinter organism and envelop
disconnected remnants thereby dismember adversary thru the tactical,
grand tactical, and strategic levels.
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- Essence of Blitzkrieg
- Employ a Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt maneuver philosophy to generate
ambiguity, realize deception, exploit superior mobility, and focus
violence as basis to quickly:
- Create many opportunities to penetrate weaknesses in the form of any
moral or mental inadequacies as well as any gaps or exposed flanks that
open into adversary’s vulnerable rear and interior, hence-
- Create and exploit opportunities to repeatedly penetrate adversary
organism, at all levels (tactical, grand tactical, and strategic) and
in many ways, in order to splinter, envelop, and roll-up/wipe-out
isolated remnants, thereby generate confusion and disorder, hence
- Create and exploit opportunities to disrupt his system for
communication, command, and support, as well as undermine or seize
those connections or centers that he depends upon, thus shake his will
or capacity to decisively commit his back-up echelons, operational
reserves, and/or strategic reserves, thereby magnify adversary’s
confusion and disorder and convince him to give up.
- Intent
- Create grand tactical success then exploit and expand it into strategic
success for a decisive victory.
- Implication
- Blitzers, by being able to infiltrate or penetrate or get inside
adversary’s system, generate many moral-mental-physical non-cooperative
(or isolated) centers of gravity, as well as undermine or seize those
centers of gravity adversary depends upon, in order to magnify friction,
produce paralysis, and bring about adversary collapse.
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- Key to success
- Emphasis on a common outlook and freedom-of-action that are exploited by
mission and Schwerpunkt concepts to fix responsibilities as well as to
rapidly shape, focus, and shift operations and support at all levels.
- Flexible command—based on a common outlook and freedom-of-action that
are exploited by mission and Schwerpunkt—that encourages lower-level
combat leaders (forward) to exploit opportunities generated by rapid
action within a broad loosely woven scheme laid down from central
command.
- Intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and stratagem emphasized
before and during combat operations to unmask and shape patterns of
adversary strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions.
- Broad use of Schwerpunkt concept coupled with fast
tempo/fluidity-of-action of armored teams and air support permit
blitzers to repeatedly reshape strength and rapidly shift it against, or
through, weaknesses thereby generate doubt and uncertainty which magnify
into panic and chaos.
- Superior mobile communications to maintain cohesion of overall effort
and to enable higher command levels to allocate reserves and support and
to reshape as well as shift focus of main effort.
- Essential and only essential logistics tail (using airlift when
appropriate and necessary) to support high-speed movement and rapid
shift among routes of advance.
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- Poland
- France
- Balkans
- Russia
- North Africa
- Russia
- Russia
- Advance thru France
- Manchuria
- Middle East
- Czechoslovakia
- Middle East
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- Action
- Capitalize on discontent and mistrust generated by corruption (real or
imagined), exploitation, oppression, incompetence, and unwanted presence
of existing regime to evolve a common cause or unifying theme as basis
to organize and maintain mass popular support through a militant
political program.
- Set-up administrative and military organization, sanctuary, and
communications network under the control of the guerrilla political
leadership without arousing regime’s intelligence and security
apparatus. Build-up a shadow government, with “parallel hierarchies”, in
localities and regions that can be made ripe for insurrection/revolution
by infiltrating cadres (vanguards) who can not only subvert existing
authority but also convert leaders and people to guerrilla cause and
organizational way.
- Exploit subversion of government and conversion of people to guerrilla
cause to create an alien atmosphere of security and intelligence in
order to “blind” regime to guerrilla plans, operations, and organization
yet make “visible” regime’s strengths, weaknesses, moves, and
intentions.
- Shape propaganda, foment civil disorders (such as rallies,
demonstrations, strikes, and riots), use selected terrorism, perform
sabotage, and exploit resulting misinformation to expand mistrust and
sow discord thereby magnify the appearance of corruption, incompetence,
etc., and the inability of regime to govern.
- Employ tiny cohesive bands for surprise hit-and-run raids against lines
of communications to gain arms and supplies as well as disrupt
government communication, coordination, and movement. Retreat and melt
into environment when faced by superior police and armed forces.
- Disperse or scatter tiny guerrilla bands to arouse the people (and gain
recruits) as well as harass, wear-out, and spread-out government forces
while larger bands, or mobile formations, concentrate to wipe-out his
dispersed, isolated, and relatively weak fractions by sudden ambush or
sneak attack.
- Play upon the grievances and obsessions of people (via propaganda,
re-education, and selected successes) as well as encourage government to
indiscriminately take harsh reprisal measures against them in order to
connect the government with expanding climate of mistrust, discord, and
moral disintegration. Simultaneously, show (by contrast) that guerrillas
exhibit moral authority, offer competence, and provide desired benefits
in order to further erode government influence, gain more recruits,
multiply base areas, and increase political infrastructure hence expand
guerrilla influence/control over population and countryside.
- Demonstrate disintegration of regime by striking cheng/ch'i fashion,
with small fluid bands and ever larger mobile formations, to split-up,
envelop, and annihilate fractions of major enemy forces.
- Idea
- Defeat existing regime politically by showing they have neither the
moral right nor demonstrated ability to govern and militarily by
continuously using stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of
small bands and larger units in cooperation with political “agitprop”
(agitation/propaganda) teams as basis to harass, confuse and ultimately
destroy the will or capacity to resist.
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- Essence
- Capitalize on corruption, injustice, incompetence, etc., (or their
appearances) as basis to generate atmosphere of mistrust and discord in
order to sever moral bonds that bind people to existing regime.
- Simultaneously,
- Share existing burdens with people and work with them to root out and
punish corruption, remove injustice, eliminate grievances, etc., as
basis to form moral bonds between people and guerrillas in order to bind
people to guerrilla philosophy and ideals.
- Intent
- Shape and exploit crises environment that permits guerrilla vanguards or
cadres to pure-up guerrilla resolve, attract the uncommitted, and
drain-away adversary resolve as foundation to replace existing regime
with guerrilla regime.
- Implication
- Guerrillas, by being able to penetrate the very essence of their
adversary’s moral-mental-physical being, generate many
moral-mental-physical non-cooperative (or isolated) centers of gravity,
as well as subvert or seize those centers of gravity that adversary
regime must depend upon, in order to magnify friction, produce
paralysis, and bring about collapse.
- Yet,
- Guerrillas shape or influence moral-mental-physical atmosphere so that
potential adversaries, as well as the uncommitted, are drawn toward
guerrilla philosophy and are empathetic toward guerrilla success.
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- Now, if we look at the ingredients that make-up modern guerrilla
campaigns as well as refer back to our discussion about Soviet
revolutionary strategy and the impact of 19th century capitalism on
insurrection/revolution, we gain some insight into the strategic
philosophy that underlies today’s guerrilla efforts.
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- Underlying strategic philosophy
- Guerrilla vanguards employ a variety of means to play-upon regime’s
internal frictions, obsessions, etc., as well as stimulate
discontent/mistrust of people. In this way, vanguards sow discord that
in turn magnifies regime’s internal frictions, obsessions, etc., thereby
paralyze its ability to come to grips with crises that further fan
atmosphere of mistrust and discord that feed crises—hence push them
out-of-control.
- Simultaneously,
- Guerrilla vanguards share burden as well as help people cope with
turmoil—that vanguards keep fanning and enmesh people into—in order to
demonstrate ability to deal with surging crises as well as shape image
that only guerrillas offer a way-out of existing unpleasant
circumstances.
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- Insurrection/revolution becomes ripe when many perceive an illegitimate
inequality—that is, when the people see themselves as being exploited
and oppressed for the undeserved enrichment and betterment of an elite
few. This means that the guerrillas not only need an illegitimate
inequality but they also need support of the people; otherwise,
insurrection/revolution is impossible.
- ? Raises question ?
- In the deepest possible sense what does it mean to have support of the
people?
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- Guerrillas must establish implicit connections or bonds with people and
countryside.
- In other words
- Guerrillas must be able to blend into the
emotional-cultural-intellectual environment of people until they become
one with the people.
- In this sense
- People feelings and thoughts must be guerrilla feeling and thoughts
while guerrilla feelings and thoughts become people feelings and
thoughts; people aspirations must be guerrilla aspirations while
guerrilla aspirations become people aspirations; people goals must be
guerrilla goals while guerrilla goals become people goals.
- Result
- Guerrillas become indistinguishable from people while government is
isolated from people.
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- Key to success
- Ability to continuously demonstrate government weakness, erode
government influence, and cause government to alienate itself from
people.
- Support of people (both psychological and physical) for intelligence,
recruits, shelter, transportation, refuge, food, money, and medical aid.
- Access to (more or less permanent) safe sanctuaries or base areas and/or
fluid bases that can be shifted from place to place, away from enemy
forces—in order to rest, recuperate, repair materiel, etc., as well as
indoctrinate, train, and equip recruits.
- Use of stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action coupled with cohesion of
guerrilla bands as basis for:
- dispersion, to arouse people, to avoid adversary strength, and to force
government to thin-out, or disperse, its strength;
- concentration, to hit and wipe-out isolated fractions;
- shifting of effort (in these as well as other activities), in order to
gain and keep initiative.
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- American Colonies
- Spain
- Russia
- German East Africa
- Arabia
- China
- Russia
- Yugoslavia
- Indochina
- Algeria
- Cuba
- South Vietnam
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- Essence
- Avoid battles—instead penetrate adversary to subvert, disrupt, or seize
those connections, centers, and activities that provide cohesion (e.g.,
psychological/moral bonds, communications, lines of communication,
command and supply centers …)
- Exploit ambiguity, deception, superior mobility, and sudden violence to
generate initial surprise and shock followed by surprise and shock
again, again, again …
- Roll-up/wipe-out the isolated units or remnants created by the
subversion, surprise, shock, disruption, and seizure.
- Intent
- Exploit subversion, surprise, shock, disruption, and seizure to generate
confusion, disorder, panic, etc., thereby shatter cohesion, paralyze
effort, and bring about adversary collapse.
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- Israeli example (a la Gen. Y. Yadin - 1949)
- To exploit the principles of war for our purpose and base ourselves
upon (the) strategic indirect approach, so as to determine the issue of
the fighting even before fighting has begun, it is necessary to achieve
the three following aims:
- to cut the enemy’s lines of communications, thus paralyzing his
physical build-up;
- to seal him off from his lines of retreat, thus undermining the
enemy’s will and destroying his morale;
- to hit his centers of administration and disrupt his communications,
thus severing the link between his brain and limbs.
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- Why have blitz and guerrilla tactics been so extraordinarily successful?
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- Blitz and guerrillas, by being able to operate in a directed, yet more
indistinct, more irregular, and quicker manner than their adversaries,
can:
- Repeatedly concentrate or disperse more inconspicuously and/or more
quickly from or to lower levels of distinction (organizational,
operational, and environmental) without losing internal harmony, as
well as,
- Repeatedly and unexpectedly infiltrate or penetrate adversaries’
vulnerabilities and weaknesses in order to splinter, isolate or
envelop, and overwhelm disconnected remnants of adversary organism.
- or put another way
- Blitz and guerrillas, by operating in a directed, yet more indistinct,
more irregular, and quicker manner, operate inside their adversaries’
observation-orientation-decision-action loops or get inside their
mind-time-space as basis to penetrate the moral-mental-physical being of
their adversaries in order to pull them apart, and bring about their
collapse.
- Underlying idea
- Such amorphous, lethal, and unpredictable activity by blitz and
guerrillas make them appear awesome and unstoppable which altogether
produce uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic …
and ultimately collapse—a notion implied by Sun Tzu around 400 B.C. and
more recently by J.F.C. Fuller after observing the impact of
Ludendorff’s infiltration tactics in 1918.
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- How can we defend against or counter the blitz?
- How can we defend against or counter the guerrilla movement?
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- Difficult to sustain fast-tempo and maintain cohesion of blitz effort
when forced to repeatedly and rapidly shift concentration of strength
against weakness.
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- Posture
- Emphasize intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and set-up
screen of forward outposts and patrols to report on adversary activity
and warn of any impending or actual incursions.
- Deploy, disperse, and frequently redeploy/redisperse reconnaissance and
mobile antitank/infantry/armored teams together with artillery in region
behind screen, so that they can mask dispositions, as well as move
inconspicuously/quickly to focus and shift local main efforts against
adversary thrusts.
- Place armored teams, as mobile reserve, in echelon behind recce,
anti-tank/infantry/armor and artillery so that they can easily focus
effort, and quickly move-in to decapitate any local breakthrough—or
push-off for a blitz counterstroke.
- Action
- Employ air and fast moving mobile/armored reconnaissance teams to
determine direction/strength of thrusts and to continuously harass by
repeated delaying actions and hit-and-run attacks in order to slow
momentum and erode cohesion of blitz attack.
- Inconspicuously move-in with high-speed mobile
anti-tank/infantry/armored teams, together with air and artillery
support, to strengthen favorable sectors. Hit adversary thrusts and
resupply efforts with ambuscades and with repeated sudden/sharp flank
and rear counter-thrusts to channel as well as drain-away momentum and
break-up cohesion of blitz thrusts.
- Concentrate swift armored combat forces (held in reserve) and use with
air to rapidly drive a shallow and/or deep flank counterstroke in order
to swing in behind and roll-up blitz offensive in detail (counterstroke
launched while adversary is moving forward).
- Idea
- Smash blitz offensive by inconspicuously using fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action
and cohesion of counter-blitz combat teams as basis for shifting of
forces and quick focus of air and ground effort to throttle momentum,
shatter cohesion, and envelop blitz in order to destroy adversary’s
capacity to resist.
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- Main features and emphasis
- Intelligence and recce action
- Infiltration/penetration and isolation
- Ambiguity, deception, speed, and violence to generate surprise and shock
- Mission/Schwerpunkt philosophy
- Acceptance of “gaps” and (related) “risks” in support of mission/Schwerpunkt
philosophy
- Echelon-in-depth (offense and defense)
- Reserves reconstituted and accumulated (at all levels) to support or
generate success
- Posture of positions, alternative positions, dummy positions and roving
positions to mask maneuvers and intentions
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- Key points
- Guerrilla vanguards need cause and support of people that is dependent
upon regime’s unwillingness/inability to come to grips with crises of
its’ own making.
- or more simply
- Crises and vanguards represent the marriage of instability and
initiative that create and expand guerrilla effort.
- hence
- The thought occurs that in order to dry-up a guerrilla upsurge one
should strike at those root causes or illegitimate inequalities that
generate and exacerbate crises as well as provide a favorable climate
for vanguards to form or operate in.
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- Action
- Undermine guerrilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating
integrity and competence of government to represent and serve needs of
people—rather than exploit and impoverish them for the benefit of a
greedy elite.*
- Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption.
Select new leaders with recognized competence as well as popular appeal.
Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate grievances and connect
government with grass roots.*
- Infiltrate guerrilla movement as well as employ population for
intelligence about guerrilla plans, operations, and organization.
- Seal-off guerrilla regions from outside world by diplomatic,
psychological, and various other activities that strip-away potential
allies as well as by disrupting or straddling communications that
connect these regions with outside world.
- Deploy administrative talent, police, and counter-guerrilla teams into
affected localities and regions to: inhibit guerrilla communication,
coordination and movement; minimize guerrilla contact with local
inhabitants; isolate their ruling cadres; and destroy their
infrastructure.
- Exploit presence of above teams to build-up local government as well as
recruit militia for local and regional security in order to protect
people from the persuasion and coercion efforts of the guerrilla cadres
and their fighting units.
- Use special teams in a complementary effort to penetrate guerrilla
controlled regions. Employ (guerrillas’ own) tactics of reconnaissance,
infiltration, surprise hit-and-run, and sudden ambush to: keep roving
bands off-balance, make base areas untenable, and disrupt communication
with outside world.
- Expand these complementary security/penetration efforts into affected
region after affected region in order to undermine, collapse, and
replace guerrilla influence with government influence and control.
- Visibly link these efforts with local political/economic/social reform
in order to connect central government with hopes and needs of people,
thereby gain their support and confirm government legitimacy.
- Idea
- Break guerrillas’ moral-mental-physical hold over the population,
destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political
initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government
and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action
and cohesion of overall effort.
- ___________
- * If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider
changing sides!
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- Note
- We have indicated again and again the importance of popular support for
guerrilla or counter-guerrilla success. Why?
- Insight
- Without support of people the guerrillas (or counter-guerrillas) have
neither a vast hidden intelligence network nor an invisible security
apparatus that permits them to “see” into adversary operations yet
“blinds” adversary to their own operations.
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- Now looking back and reflecting upon the panorama of military history we
can imagine three kinds of human conflict:
- Attrition warfare—as practiced by the Emperor Napoleon, by all sides
during the 19th century and during World War I, by the Allies during
World War II, and by present-day nuclear planners.
- Maneuver conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, General Bonaparte,
Confederate General Stonewall Jackson, Union General Ulysses S. Grant,
Hitler’s Generals (in particular Manstein, Guderian, Balck, Rommel) and
the Americans under Generals Patton and MacArthur.
- Moral conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, most guerrilla leaders, a
very few counter-guerrillas (such as Magsaysay) and certain others from
Sun Tzu to the present.
- With these comments in mind let’s look into the essentials of each.
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- Firepower, as a destructive force, is king.
- Protection (trenches, armor, dispersion, etc.) is used to weaken or
dilute effects of enemy firepower.
- Mobility is used to bring firepower to bear or to evade enemy fire.
- Measures of success are (now) “body count” and targets destroyed.
- Seize and hold terrain objectives replaces Napoleon’s dictum: Destroy
enemy army.
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- Create and exploit
- Destructive force:
- Weapons (mechanical, chemical, biological, nuclear, etc.) that kill,
maim, and/or otherwise generate widespread destruction.
- Protection:
- Ability to minimize the concentrated and explosive expression of
destructive force by taking cover behind natural or manmade obstacles,
by dispersion of people and resources, and by being obscure using
camouflage, smoke, etc., together with cover and dispersion.
- Mobility:
- Speed or rapidity to focus destructive force or move away from
adversary’s destructive focus.
- Payoff
- Frightful and debilitating attrition via widespread destruction as basis
to:
- Break enemy’s will to resist
- Seize and hold terrain objectives
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- Ambiguity, deception, novelty, mobility, and violence (or threat
thereof) are used to generate surprise and shock.
- Fire and movement are used in combination, like cheng/ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt,
to tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention and strength in
order to expose as well as menace and exploit vulnerabilities or
weaknesses elsewhere.
- Indications of success tend to be qualitative and are related to the
widespread onset of confusion and disorder, frequent envelopments, high
prisoner counts, or any other phenomenon that suggests inability to
adapt to change.
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- Create, exploit, and magnify
- Ambiguity
- Alternative or competing impressions of events as they may or may not
be.
- Deception
- An impression of events as they are not.
- Novelty
- Impressions associated with events/ideas that are unfamiliar or have
not been experienced before.
- Fast transient maneuvers
- Irregular and rapid/abrupt shift from one maneuver event/state to
another.
- Effort (cheng/ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt)
- An expenditure of energy or an irruption of violence—focused into, or
thru, features that permit an organic whole to exist.
- Payoff
- Disorientation
- Mismatch between events one (seemingly) observes or anticipates and
events (or efforts) he must react or adapt to.
- Surprise
- Disorientation generated by perceiving extreme change (of events or
efforts) over a short period of time.
- Shock
- Paralyzing state of disorientation generated by extreme or violent
change (of events or efforts) over a short period of time.
- Disruption
- State of being split-apart, broken-up, or torn asunder.
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- Surprise and shock can also be represented as an overload beyond one’s
immediate ability to respond or adapt. In this context, we may view the
“Essence of Maneuver Conflict” a bit differently—
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- Create, exploit, and magnify
- Ambiguity:
- Alternative or competing impressions of events as they may or may not
be.
- Deception:
- An impression of events as they are not.
- Novelty:
- Impressions associated with events/ideas that are unfamiliar or have
not been experienced before.
- Fast transient maneuvers:
- Irregular and rapid/abrupt shift from one maneuver event/state to
another.
- Effort (cheng/ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt):
- An expenditure of energy or an irruption of violence—focused into, or
thru, features that permit an organic whole to exist.
- Payoff
- Disorientation:
- Mismatch between events one observes or imagines and events (or
efforts) he must react or adapt to.
- Disruption:
- State of being split-apart, broken-up, or torn asunder.
- Overload:
- A welter of threatening events/efforts beyond one’s mental or physical
capacity to adapt or endure.
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- Theme
- No fixed recipes for organization, communications, tactics, leadership,
etc.
- Wide freedom for subordinates to exercise imagination and initiative—yet
harmonize within intent of superior commanders.
- Heavy reliance upon moral (human values) instead of material superiority
as basis for cohesion and ultimate success.
- Commanders must create a bond and breadth of experience based upon trust—not
mistrust—for cohesion.
- How is this atmosphere achieved?
- By example leaders (at all levels) must demonstrate requisite physical
energy, mental agility, and moral authority, to inspire subordinates to
enthusiastically cooperate and take initiatives within superiors intent.
- What is the price?
- Courage to share danger and discomfort at the front.
- Willingness to support and promote (unconventional or difficult)
subordinates that accept danger, demonstrate initiative, take risks, and
come-up with new ways toward mission accomplishment.
- Dedication and resolve to face-up to and master uncomfortable
circumstances that fly in the face of the traditional solution.
- Benefit
- Internal simplicity that permits rapid adaptability.
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- Page 124
- “In the First World War ‘cellar life’ had been a feature of the
adversities of Paris, which actually came under the fire of specially
built long-range guns in 1918, as well as aircraft bombing. In the East End of London air raids
cause a tendency to panic in the latter part of 1917, and, whether there
was a raid or not, some 300,000 people crowded each night into the
underground railway stations and slept on the platforms … There was
little organized civil defence beyond the reduction of lights.”
- Page 161
- “The Germans, who were far ahead of any rival in the science of
lighter-than-air construction, refused to accept the general belief that
the future lay entirely with the heavier-than-air. Their Zeppelins …
were employed chiefly in night attacks on England. On one occasion a
single airship did a million pounds worth of damage in a raid, but on
the whole their success was mainly moral and measured in terms of
absenteeism in factories and sensational drops in production of warlike
material.”
- Page 165
- “Early in the war the German Armies owed much in their victories in
Poland, Belgium, and France to their dive-bombers. These aircraft acted
in close support to the armour and infantry … They often put hostile
artillery out of action, but generally by driving the detachments from
their guns. The successes were won for the most part by moral rather
than material effect. To troops
unused to them, especially the French division of low categories, they
proved extremely unsettling.”
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- Insights regarding Falls’ statement and Balck’s ideas
- From Falls’ comments we note (with slight alteration) the following
words and phrases: panic … moral … absenteeism … sensational drops in
production … dive bombers success were for the most part moral-to troops
unused to them … they proved extremely unsettling. A quick glance shows
that all these words and phrases are directly related to one another.
- Going even further we can say: Falls’ comments on pages 124, 161, and
165 suggest that moral effects are related to the menace posed by the
Zeppelins and dive bombers, and the uncertainty associated with not
knowing what to expect or how to deal with this menace. Put simply: Moral-effects
are related to menace and uncertainty.
- For a first cut this suggests that moral-strength represents mental
capacity to overcome menace and uncertainty.
- On the other hand, this first cut seems to leave out something that
humans either need or must overcame for collective moral strength.
Fortunately we have some clues:
- First: Remember that guerrilla commanders (see Modern Guerrilla
Campaign) stress use of propaganda, civil disorders, selected
terrorism, etc., as basis to generate mistrust and discord.
- Second: Balck emphasizes the importance of trust—not mistrust—for
cohesion.
- Now, recognizing that both Balck and guerrilla commanders work in a
hostile environment (of menace and uncertainty) that naturally breeds
mistrust, it is clear that moral effects must include this factor.
- This suggest moral strength represents mental capacity to overcome menace,
uncertainty, and mistrust.
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- Now by using moral strength as a point of departure—and by feeding in
those unsettling or threatening experiences (a la Clausewitz) that
either bring out fear, anxiety, and alienation, or their more noble
counterweights: courage, confidence, and esprit—we can evolve the
following related notions:
- Moral strength: Mental capacity to overcome menace, uncertainty, and
mistrust.
- Moral victory: Triumph of courage, confidence, and esprit (de corps)
over fear, anxiety, and alienation when confronted by menace,
uncertainty, and mistrust.
- Moral defeat: Triumph of fear, anxiety, and alienation over courage,
confidence, and esprit when confronted by menace, uncertainty, and
mistrust.
- Moral values: Human values that permit one to carry on in the face of
menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
- Moral authority: Person or body that can give one the courage,
confidence, and esprit to overcome menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
- Finally, by stripping away and recombining essentials—from these notions
as well as from the ideas and experiences of Clausewitz, Balck, and
Falls—we can evolve the Essence of Moral Conflict.
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- Create, exploit, and magnify
- Menace:
- Impressions of danger to one’s well being and survival.
- Uncertainty:
- Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by events that appear ambiguous,
erratic, contradictory, unfamiliar, chaotic, etc.
- Mistrust:
- Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that loosens human bonds among
members of an organic whole or between organic wholes.
- Idea
- Surface, fear, anxiety, and alienation in order to generate many
non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as subvert those that
adversary depends upon, thereby magnify internal friction.
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- Suspicion
- The essence of moral conflict, as presented, seems to be one-sided and
emphasizes the negative or dark side of one’s moral make-up.
- ? Raises question ?
- How do we bring out the positive side? In other words—if courage,
confidence, and esprit represent the positive counterweights to fear,
anxiety, and alienation—what are the positive counterweights to menace,
uncertainty, and mistrust?
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- In addressing this question we find that the counterweights to menace
and uncertainty are not at all obvious unless we start with mistrust and
work in reverse order. Proceeding in this way we note that:
- The presence of mistrust implies that there is a rupture or loosening
of the human bonds or connections that permit individuals to work as an
organic whole harmony with one another. This suggests that harmony
itself represents an appropriate counterweight to mistrust.
- In dealing with uncertainty, adaptability seems to be the right
counterweight. Otherwise, how can one adjust to the unforeseen or
unpredictable nature of uncertainty?
- Finally, with respect to menace one cannot be passive. Instead, initiative
is needed otherwise menace may obliterate the benefits associated with
harmony and adaptability. Intuitively, this suggests that initiative is
the right counterweight here.
- Using these ideas, together with the previous ideas already uncovered,
we can modify and enrich the essence of moral conflict as follows:
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- Negative factors
- Menace:
- Impressions of danger to one’s well being and survival
- Uncertainty:
- Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by events that appear ambiguous,
erratic, contradictory, unfamiliar, chaotic, etc.
- Mistrust:
- Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that loosens human bonds among
members of an organic whole or between organic wholes
- Counterweights
- Initiative:
- Internal drive to think and take action without being urged
- Adaptability:
- Power to adjust or change in order to cope with new or unforeseen
circumstances
- Harmony:
- Interaction of apparently disconnected events or entities in a
connected way
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- Goal
- Plan
- Action
- Support
- Command
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- Goal
- Diminish adversary’s freedom-of-action while improving our
freedom-of-action, so that our adversary cannot cope—while we can
cope—with events/efforts as they unfold.
- Plan
- Probe and test adversary to unmask strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and
intentions.
- Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace-uncertainty-mistrust
with tangles of ambiguity-deception-novelty as basis to sever
adversary’s moral ties and disorient or twist his mental images, hence
mask-distort-magnify our presence and activities.
- Select initiative (or response) that is least expected.
- Establish focus of main effort together with other (related) effort and
pursue directions that permit many happenings, offer many branches, and
threaten alternative objectives.
- Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit success).
- Exploit, rather than disrupt or destroy, those differences, frictions,
obsessions, etc., of adversary organism that interfere with his ability
to cope with unfolding circumstances.
- Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize adversary’s vulnerable,
yet critical, connections, centers, and activities that provide cohesion
and permit coherent observation-orientation-decision-action in order to
dismember organism and isolate remnants for absorption or mop-up.
- Action
- Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more
irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as shape and
shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate
vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s)
that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength)
elsewhere.
- Support
- Superior mobile communications
- Only essential logistics
- Command
- Decentralize, in a tactical sense, to encourage lower-level commanders
to shape, direct, and take the sudden/sharp actions necessary to quickly
exploit opportunities as they present themselves.
- Centralize, in a strategic sense, to establish aims, match ambitions
with means/talent, sketch flexible plans, allocate resources, and shape
focus of overall effort.
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- Plan and action statements suggest that we are trying to:
- Penetrate adversary system and mask own system against his penetration;
- Create a variety of impressions of what is occurring and what is about
to occur;
- Generate mismatches between what seems to be and what is;
- Push adversary beyond his ability to adapt.
- Intentions that make-up plan cannot happen without application of
transients that make-up action.
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- Note how these strategic and tactical ideas, that we evolved from the plan
and action statements, fit in nicely with the following comments by
Napoleon:
- “The art of land warfare is an art of genius, of inspiration … A
general never knows anything with certainty, never sees his enemy
clearly, never knows positively where he is. When armies are face to
face, the least accident in the ground, the smallest wood, may conceal
part of the enemy army. The most experienced eye cannot be sure whether
it sees the whole of the enemy’s army or only three-fourths. It is by
the mind’s eye, by the integration of all reasoning, by a kind of
inspiration, that the general sees, knows, and judges.”
- “The first quality for a commander in chief is a cool head which
receives a just impression of things; he should not allow himself to be
confused by either good or bad news; the impressions which he receives
successively or simultaneously in the course of a day should classify
themselves in his mind in such a way as to occupy the place which they
merit; because reason and judgment are the result of the comparison of
various impressions taken into just consideration.”
- Above comments, by Napoleon, reveal ever-present vulnerabilities and
weaknesses that commanders and subordinates alike must accept.
- hence
- If we turn these comments around and connect them with the tactical and
strategic ideas presented thus far, we surface a modern notion of grand
tactics.
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- Grand tactics
- Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action
loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create a tangle of
threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly
generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or
anticipates, and those he must react to, to survive;
- thereby
- Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of
uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos …
and/or fold adversary back inside himself;
- thereby
- Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or
endure so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus his
efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive
strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm
him.
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- Intentions
- Probe and test adversary to unmask strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and
intentions.
- Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace-uncertainty-mistrust
with tangles of ambiguity-deception-novelty as basis to sever
adversary’s moral ties and disorient …
- Select initiative (or response) that is least expected.
- Establish focus of main effort together with other effort and pursue
directions that permit many happenings, offer many branches, and
threaten alternative objectives.
- Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit success).
- Exploit, rather than disrupt or destroy, those differences, frictions,
and obsessions of adversary organism that interfere with his ability to
cope …
- Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize adversary’s vulnerable,
yet critical, connections, centers, and activities … in order to
dismember organism and isolate remnants for wrap-up or absorption.
- Generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic, chaos … to shatter
cohesion, produce paralysis and bring about collapse.
- Become an extraordinary commander.
- Transients
- Observe, orient, decide and act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and
with more irregularity …
- or put another way
- Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision action loops
or get inside his mind-time-space.
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- Strategy
- Penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral
fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and
overload his system—as well as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise
subdue those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities
that he depends upon—in order to destroy internal harmony, produce
paralysis, and collapse adversary’s will to resist.
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- Tactics
- Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with
more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as shape
and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate
vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s)
that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength)
elsewhere.
- Grand tactics
- Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action
loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create tangles of
threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly
generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or
imagines, and those he must react to, to survive;
- thereby
- Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of
uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos …
and/or fold adversary back inside himself;
- thereby
- Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or
endure so that tie can neither divine our intentions nor focus his
efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive
strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm
him.
- Strategy
- Penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral
fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and overload
his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise subdue
those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he
depends upon, in order to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis,
and collapse adversary’s will to resist.
- Strategic aim
- Diminish adversary’s capacity while improving our capacity to adapt as
an organic whole, so that our adversary cannot cope—while we can
cope—with events/efforts as they unfold.
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- Now, after some introspection, it is not difficult to see that these
tactical and strategic statements are very definitely destructive in
nature. Keeping these words in mind, while working backwards thru this
presentation, one is left with the impression that the destructive
attrition-maneuver-moral ideas played-out in the “Categories of
Conflict” aren’t much different than the tactical and strategic ideas
that we have just discussed.
- As a consequence, by stripping-down and recombining the ideas associated
with both these conceptual streams, we can evolve an alternative
portrait of ruin as follows:
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- Synthesize
- Lethal effort:
- Tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention and strength as well
as (or thereby) overload critical vulnerabilities and generate
weaknesses.
- Maneuver:
- Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize those vulnerable yet
critical connections, centers, and activities as basis to penetrate,
splinter, and isolate remnants of adversary organism for mop-up or
absorption.
- Moral:
- Create an atmosphere of fear, anxiety, and alienation to sever human
bonds that permit an organic whole to exist.
- Idea
- Destroy adversary’s moral-mental-physical harmony, produce paralysis,
and collapse his will to resist.
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- Underlying insight
- Unless one can penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being, and
sever those interacting bonds that permit him to exist as an organic
whole, by being able to subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise subdue
those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he
depends upon, one will find it exceedingly difficult, if not
impossible, to collapse adversary’s will to resist.
- which leads to
- The name-of-the-game
- Morally-mentally-physically isolate adversary from allies or any
outside support as well as isolate elements of adversary or adversaries
form on another and overwhelm them by being able to penetrate and
splinter their moral-mental-physical being at any and all levels.
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- How do we connect the tactical and strategic notions, or the theme for
disintegration and collapse, with the national goal?
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- Support national goal.
- Pump-up our resolve, drain-away adversary resolve, and attract the
uncommitted.
- End conflict on favorable terms.
- Ensure that conflict and peace terms do not provide seeds for
(unfavorable) future conflict.
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- Essence
- Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit
and strength (while undermining and isolating our adversaries) but also
influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are
drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success.
- Basis
- An appreciation for the underlying self-interests, critical differences
of opinion, internal contradictions, frictions, obsessions, etc., that
we as well as the uncommitted and any potential or real adversaries must
contend with.
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- National goal
- Improve our fitness, as an organic whole, to shape and cope with an
ever-changing environment.
- Grand strategy
- Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit
and strength (while undermining and isolating our adversaries) but also
influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are
drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success.
- Strategic aim
- Diminish adversary’s capacity while improving our capacity to adapt as
an organic whole, so that our adversary cannot cope—while we can
cope—with events/efforts as they unfold.
- Strategy
- Penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral
fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and
overload his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise
subdue those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities
that he depends upon, in order to destroy internal harmony, produce
paralysis, and collapse adversary’s will to resist.
- Grand tactics
- Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action
loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create tangles of
threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly
generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or
imagines, and those he must react to, to survive;
- thereby
- Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of
uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos …
and/or fold adversary back inside himself;
- thereby
- Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt
or endure so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus his
efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive
strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm
him.
- Tactics
- Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with
more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as shape
and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate
vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other
effort(s) that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and
strength) elsewhere.
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- On one hand, as shown on the previous chart, the national goal and grand
strategy tend to be constructive in nature. On the other hand, the
strategic aim, strategy, grand tactics, and tactics are destructive in
nature and operate over a shorter time frame.
- In this sense, the upper two and the latter four notions, as expressed,
appear to be in disharmony with one another. Yet, application of these
latter four strategic and tactical notions permit real leadership to
avoid high attrition, avoid widespread destruction, and gain a quick
victory. This combined with shattered cohesion, paralysis, and rapid
collapse demonstrated by the existing adversary regime, makes it appear
corrupt, incompetent, and unfit to govern.
- Under these circumstances, leaders and statesmen offering generous terms
can form the basis for a viable peace. In this sense, the first two and
the latter four notions can be in harmony with one another.
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- Up to this point—by repeatedly adding, stripping-away, and recombining
many different, yet similar, ideas and thoughts—we have examined the
nature of conflict, survival, and conquest in many different ways.
- A review and further manipulation of the ideas and thoughts that make-up
these different ways suggests that, for success over the long haul and
under the most difficult conditions, one needs some unifying vision that
can be used to attract the uncommitted as well as pump-up friendly
resolve and drive and drain-away or subvert adversary resolve and drive.
In other words, what is needed is a vision rooted in human nature so
noble, so attractive that it not only attracts the uncommitted and
magnifies the spirit and strength of its adherents, but also undermines
the dedication and determination of any competitors or adversaries.
- Moreover, such a unifying notion should be so compelling that it acts as
a catalyst or beacon around which to evolve those qualities that permit
a collective entity or organic whole to improve its stature in the
scheme of things. Put another way, we are suggesting a need for a
supra-orientation or center-of-gravity that permits leaders, and other
authorities, to inspire their followers and members to enthusiastically
take action toward confronting and conquering all obstacles that stand
in the way.
- Such a scheme can be portrayed as follows:
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- Unifying vision
- A grand ideal, overarching theme, or noble philosophy that represents a
coherent paradigm within which individuals as well as societies can
shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances—yet offers a way to expose
flaws of competing or adversary systems.
- Ingredients needed to pursue vision
- Insight
- Ability to peer into and discern the inner nature or workings of
things.
- Initiative
- Internal drive to think and take action without being urged.
- Agility
- Power to adjust or change in order to cope with new or unforeseen
circumstances.
- Harmony
- Power to perceive or create interaction of apparently disconnected
events or entities in a connected way.
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- Maneuver scheme
- Employ cheng/Nebenpunkte as basis to repeatedly and unexpectedly tie-up,
divert, stretch-out, or drain-away adversary attention and strength in
order to expose vulnerabilities and weaknesses for decisive stroke(s) by
ch'i/Schwerpunkt.
- Aim
- Blind-side adversary regardless of circumstances.
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- Shape adversary impression
- Arrange elements of defense (in harmony with penchant for humans to
generate mental patterns), as basis to guide adversaries to form or
project patterns on the environment they are facing. In other words,
emphasize certain features so that adversary intelligence, recce,
patrols, and other observation activity generate mental pictures of
what we seem to be doing.
- In this sense, we cause adversary to project tempo or rhythm as well as
a sense of form or gestalt upon the environment. Naturally, this raises
the question: How do we want our posture to appear to an adversary—or
put another way, what kind of mental picture do we want him to generate
in his mind?
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- How?
- Set-up positions echeloned-in-depth (similar to German philosophy) with
flexibility to quickly rotate or shift both front and flank maneuver
schemes-yet convince adversary (with help from “shaping” and
“disruption” agencies/activities—intelligence, electronic warfare,
etc.) that he is facing, for example, an in-depth
strongpoint/checkerboard or multiple belts of an in depth linear or
elastic defense. In this sense, we suggest three belts or bands behind
the front as follows:
- Emphasize intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and set-up
screen of forward outposts and patrols to report on adversary activity
and warn of any in pending or actual incursions.
- Deploy, disperse, and frequently redeploy/redisperse reconnaissance
and mobile anti-tank/infantry/armored teams together with artillery in
region behind screen, so that they can mask dispositions, as well as
move inconspicuously/quickly to focus and shift local main efforts
against adversary thrusts.
- Place armored teams, as mobile reserve, in echelon behind recce,
antitank/infantry/armor and artillery so that they can easily focus
effort, and quickly move-in to decapitate any local breakthrough—or
push-off for a blitz counterstroke.
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- Game
- Shift from such an ambiguous or misleading posture into a gauntlet
defense with alternate channels, sectors, or zones by thinning-out some
sectors or zones in order to strengthen others.
- Basic notion is to think in terms of channels, avenues and gauntlets
(instead of just belts, bands and fronts) so that ambush gauntlets will
naturally evolve or be set-up to deal with forward as well as lateral
(roll-out) thrusts of adversary. In this way, ambush gauntlets can then
be set-up at any level from platoon to theater.
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- Basic maneuver
- Use obstacles, delaying actions, hit-and-run attacks, and/or baited
retreats in thinned-out sectors/zones together with “shaping” and
“disruption” activities to disorient adversary as well as pile-up or
stretch-out his maneuver. Combine this action with fire and movement
into adversary flank and/or rear from strengthened adjacent
sectors/zones to:
- slow momentum and blow adversary away (during pile-up) or
- channel momentum then decapitate and break-up cohesion of thrust
(during stretch-out).
- Mental picture
- Think of obstacles, delay, hit-and-run, and baited retreats together
with “shaping” and “disruption”
activities as cheng or Nebenpunkte to create caps, exposed flanks, and
vulnerable rears by the pile-up/congestion or stretch-out of adversary
maneuver.
- Think of ch'i or Schwerpunkt maneuver (fire and movement) hitting
unexpectedly thru gaps into adversary flank/rear, or blind-side, as a
decisive stroke to pull enemy apart and roll-up his isolated remnants.
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- Action
- Employ air and fast raving mobile/armored recce teams, with mobile
antitank teams, artillery, and “shaping”/”disruption” activities in
support, as Nebenpunkte to determine direction/strength of thrusts and
(by local front/flank combinations) to continuously harass with repeated
delaying actions and hit-and-run attacks. Object is to:
- disorient adversary;
- provide information to senior commanders to help them decide which
sectors to thin-out and which to strengthen;
- pile-up or stretch-out adversary maneuver to “shape” (or disrupt)
tempo/rhythm and pattern of blitz attack as well as create gaps,
exposed flanks, and vulnerable rears.
- Inconspicuously move-in with high-speed mobile
anti-tank/infantry/armored teams together with air and artillery support
as Schwerpunkt to strengthen appropriate sectors that flank adversary
thrusts. From here, exploit gaps, or any other vulnerabilities and
weaknesses, to ambush adversary with fire together with sudden/sharp
flank and rear counter-thrusts into his forward, roll-out, and resupply
efforts moving through out thinned-out sectors. Object is to work Schwerpunkt
in harmony with Nebenpunkte in order to break-up cohesion and roll-up
isolated remnants of blitz thrusts.
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- Mental picture
- Imagine the fluid cheng/ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt
counter-operations just discussed to be super Nebenpunkte operations
that are used to tie—up or drain-away adversary strength. Idea is to
set-up and launch a blitz counter-stroke, or super Schwerpunkt, deep
into adversary weakness while he (with his strength) is preoccupied in
overcoming the challenge posed by the super Nebenpunkte operations.
- Action
- Keep pressure on and continually force adversary to adapt to many abrupt
and irregular changes generated by the ongoing super Nebenpunkte
operations.
- When adversary is strung-out, or disconnected, and vulnerable: Unleash
swift armored forces (held in reserve) together with air to hook-in
behind and roll-up adversary blitz as well as push-off for a blitz
counteroffensive. Shift forces, as appropriate, from local Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt
operations (as well as from other sectors) into this super Schwerpunkt
to both generate and exploit a decisive success.
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- Extensive use of many shallow, lower-level Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt
actions across many sectors/zones drains-away resources needed for fewer
but decisive large scale Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt operations.
- Furthermore, experience has shown, when under active pressure, it is
difficult to disengage forces committed to these local efforts and shift
them to the larger operation.
- In this sense, these many shallow lower-level actions or maneuvers
across a broad front tend to take-on the character battle or attrition
warfare while deep, large scale (up to theater level) Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt
operations take-on the character of strategic maneuver.
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- Underlying idea
- Pull adversary apart and bring about his collapse by causing him to
generate or project mental images that agree neither with the faster
tempo/rhythm nor with the hidden form of the transient maneuver
patterns to must compete against.
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- Background
- Strategic design
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- Battle of Leuctra and Leuthen
- Battle of Canne
- Schlieffen strategic maneuver
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- Single envelopment schemes (a la Leuctra, Leuthen, or Schlieffen) take
less force than double envelopment schemes (a la Marathon or Cannae) to
achieve the same benefit.
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- Key point
- Germans had more forces than Poles.
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- Key points
- Germans had fewer forces than allies before Phase I.
- Germans had more forces than allies before Phase II.
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- Key point
- Germans had fewer forces than Russians.
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- Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen
- Manstein - France (Phase I) 1940
- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
- Manstein - Kerch Peninsula 1942
- OKW/OKH - Caucasus/Stalingrad counterstroke 1942
- Manstein - Donetz counterstroke 1943
- Manstein proposal - counterstroke from Kharkov to Sea of Azov 1943
- Rundstedt/Rommel proposal - Normandy 1944
- Ardennes - 1944-45
- Cannae—with Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen undertone
- Poland - 1939
- France (Phase II) - 1940
- Russia - 1941
- Kursk - 1943
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- How come Germans did not attempt a Leuctra/Leuthen strategic maneuver
against Russia in 1941?
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- Rundstedt
- The 1941 operations in Russia should, in my opinion have had their main
effort directed, not at first towards Moscow, but towards Leningrad.
That would have linked up with the Finns. Then, in the next stage,
should have come an attack on Moscow from the north, in co-operation
with the advance of Field-Marshal von Bock’s Army Group from the west.
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- Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen
- Manstein - France (Phase I) 1940
- Rundstedt proposal - thrust to Leningrad followed by thrust (roll-up) to
south and take Moscow - 1941
- Manstein - Kerch Peninsula 1942
- OKW/OKF - Caucasus/Stalingrad counterstroke 1942
- Manstein - Donetz counterstroke 1943
- Manstein proposal - counterstroke from Kharkov to Sea of Azov 1943
- Rundstedt/Rommel proposal - Normandy 1944
- Ardennes - 1944-45
- Cannae—with Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen undertone
- Poland - 1939
- France (Phase II) - 1940
- Russia - 1941
- Kursk - 1943
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- Only Manstein (and few others) knew how to synthesize and apply the
experiences and ideas of Napoleon, Clausewitz, Jomini, Moltke, and Schlieffen
in a strategic as well as a grand tactical sense.
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- Message
- He who is willing and able to take the initiative to exploit variety, rapidity,
and harmony—as the basis to create as well as adapt to the more
indistinct - more irregular - quicker changes of rhythm and pattern, yet
shape the focus and direction of effort—survives and dominates.
- or contrariwise
- He who is unwilling or unable to take the initiative to exploit variety,
rapidity, and harmony … goes under or survives to be dominated.
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- Game
- Create tangles of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as
well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts
adversary observes or imagines (cheng/Nebenpunkte) and those he must
react to (ch'i/Schwerpunkt)
- as basis to
- Penetrate adversary organism to sever his moral bonds, disorient his
mental images, disrupt his operations, and overload his system, as well
as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise subdue those
moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he
depends upon
- thereby
- Pull adversary apart, produce paralysis, and collapse his will to
resist.
- How
- Get inside adversary observation-orientation-decision-action loops (at
all levels) by being more subtle, more indistinct, more irregular, and
quicker—yet appear to be otherwise.
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- Implications
- In a tactical sense, these multi-dimensional interactions suggest a spontaneous,
synthetic/creative, and flowing action/counteraction operation, rather
than a step-by-step, analytical/logical, and discrete move/countermove
game.
- In accepting this idea we must admit that increased unit complexity
(with magnified mental and physical task loadings) does not enhance the
spontaneous synthetic/creative operation. Rather, it constrains the
opportunity for these timely actions/counteractions.
- or put another way
- Complexity (technical, organizational, operational, etc.) causes
commanders and subordinates alike to be captured by their own internal
dynamics or interactions—hence they cannot adapt to rapidly changing
external (or even internal) circumstances.
- In a strategic sense, these interactions suggest we need a variety of
possibilities as well as the rapidity to implement and shift among them.
Why?
- Ability to simultaneously and sequentially generate many different
possibilities as well as rapidly implement and shift among them permits
one to repeatedly generate mismatches between events/efforts adversary
observes or imagines and those he must respond to (to survive).
- Without a variety of possibilities, adversary is given the opportunity
to read as well as adapt to events and efforts as they unfold.
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- Alternatively—by stripping away and recombining some of the comments
associated with “Clausewitz”,
“Grand Tactics”, “Message”, “Game”, “How”, and “Implications”—we
can say:
- Variety/Rapidity allow one to:
- Magnify adversary friction hence stretch-out his time to respond in a
directed way.
- Harmony/Initiative permit on to:
- Diminish own friction hence compress own time to exploit
variety/rapidity in a directed way.
- Altogether Variety/Rapidity/Harmony/Initiative enable one to:
- Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action
loops to enmesh adversary in a world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust,
confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos, …
and/or fold adversary back inside himself so that he cannot
cope with events/efforts as they unfold.
- Simultaneously—by repeatedly rolling-thru O-O-D-A loops while appealing
to and making use of the ideas embodied in “Grand Strategy” and “Theme
for Vitality and Growth”—we can:
- Evolve and exploit Insight/Initiative/Adaptability/Harmony as basis to:
- Shape or influence events so that we not only amplify our spirit and
strength (while isolating our adversaries and undermining their
resolve and drive) but also influence the uncommitted or potential
adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are
empathetic toward our success.
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- —or summarizing in another, yet similar way—
- We have in a nutshell:
- The art of success
- Appear to be an unsolvable cryptogram while operating in a directed way
to penetrate adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses in order to
isolate him from his allies, pull him apart, and collapse his will to
resist.
- yet
- Shape or influence events so that we not only magnify our spirit and
strength but also influence potential adversaries as well as the
uncommitted so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are
empathetic toward our success.
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- Reflection upon the previous discussion and reflection upon the various
principles of war that are bandied about leave one unsettled about the
real value associated with these principles.
- To illustrate, let’s take a look at some of the principles of war (or
military art).
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- Aim/goal
- Coordination
- Offensive
- Freedom of action
- Concentration
- Economy of efforts
- Surprise
- Security
- Morale
- Control of rear
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- A list of principles does not reveal how individual principles interact
nor the mechanism for doing so.
- Scientific laws and principles are the same for all countries and tend
to change little over time. On the other hand, we note that the
principles of war are different for different countries and change more
dramatically over time. Furthermore, they do not make evident the
importance of variety/rapidity/harmony/
initiative as basis to shape and adapt to circumstances—a
necessary requirement for success in the uncertain and ever-changing
environment of conflict or war.
- This would suggest that the principles are not principles. Instead, they
seem to be some kind of a (shifting) static checklist or laundry list of
what should be adhered to.
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- With this critique in mind, if we still feel we need some guidance, why
not evolve statements that reflect the essence of conflict dynamics in a
connected sense?
- or put another way
- Why not collect appropriate bits and pieces and assemble them in a
coherent way to present a more satisfying picture?
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- Compress own time and stretch-out adversary time.
- Generate unequal distributions as basis to focus moral-mental-physical
effort for local superiority and decisive leverage.
- Diminish own friction (or entropy) and magnify adversary friction (or
entropy).
- Operate inside adversary’s observation—orientation-decision-action loops
or get inside his mind-time-space.
- Penetrate adversary organism and bring about his collapse.
- Amplify our spirit and strength, drain-away adversaries’ and attract the
uncommitted.
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- Evolve and exploit insight/initiative/adaptability/harmony together with
a unifying vision, via a grand ideal or an overarching theme or a noble
philosophy, as basis to:
- Shape or influence events so that we not only amplify our spirit and
strength but also influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so
that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our
success,
- yet be able to
- Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action
loops or get inside his mind-time-space as basis to:
- Penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being in order to isolate
him from his allies, pull him apart, and collapse his will to resist.
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- This edition of “Patterns of Conflict” is our attempt to recreate the
last version of the briefing actually presented by the late Col John
Boyd, USAF (1927 – 1997). The
last printed version known to exist carries the date December 1986. We have used that as the starting
point, and then modified the text based on changes we received from Col
Boyd, which continued until around 1991.
By that time, he had moved on to other activities, such as
“Conceptual Spiral,” his advice to then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
during the First Gulf War, and his interest in application to other
forms of conflict, including business.
- In addition to specific textual changes, Col Boyd would routinely
emphasize certain points during his briefings that he probably would
have incorporated into the charts, but never did (this was
pre-PowerPoint and so changes were becoming more difficult for him to
obtain.) We have indicated some
of these by “JRB comment:”
- The original 1986 version, with pen-and-ink changes as dictated by Col
Boyd, is available in PDF format at http://www.d-n-i.net.
- About the Editors
- Chuck Spinney was a colleague of Boyd’s both in the Air Force and in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he participated in every
edition of “Patterns.” Chuck is the author of Defense Facts of Life and
numerous monographs and op-eds. His commentaries on defense issues
appear from time to time and are archived at http://www.d-n-i.net.
- Chet Richards worked with Col Boyd on his first paper, “Destruction and
Creation,” on various editions of “Patterns,” and near the end of Boyd’s
life, on business applications.
He is a retired colonel in the Air Force Reserve, and recently
finished a book, Certain to Win, that applies Boyd’s concepts to
business.
- Ginger Richards is co-owner and president of Kettle Creek Corporation,
which owns Defense and the National Interest. She designed and maintains that site
as well as its sister, http://www.belisarius.com, which is oriented more
towards business.
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